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JUSTIFICATION AND WAYS OF BELIEVING
Heimir Geirsson
Iowa State University
One of the issues that has been hotly discussed in connection with the direct
designation theory is whether or not coreferential names can be substituted
salva veritate in epistemic contexts. Some direct designation theorists
believe that they can be so substituted. Some direct designation theorists and
all Fregeans and neo-Fregeans believe that they cannot be so substituted.
Fregeans of various stripes have used their intuition against free substitution
to argue against the direct designation theory. Some direct designation
theorists have used the same intuitions to argue against the view that belief
reports of simple declarative sentences can be accounted for with singular
propositions.1 This paper has two main goals; first, to show that the discus-
sion of the issue has tended to treat all epistemic contexts equally, and
second, to argue that we should not treat substitutions in contexts that
involve justification (and hence knowledge) in the same way as we treat
substitution in simple belief contexts, i.e., contexts that just involve the
belief relation.
I.
Much of the recent discussion on substitutivity has conflated all epistemic
contexts and often indiscriminately shifts between one believing that a=b
and one knowing that a=b. This, I contend, can result in our strong intuitions
that names cannot be substituted freely in knowledge contents transferring to
—————
1 Most notable of these are Mark Richard and Mark Crimmins. Both argue that we
cannot account for our intuitions regarding substitution (among other things) while
using singular propositions. Both then go on to introduce propositions that contain
elements in addition to the object referred to and the property attributed to it. See M.
Crimmins, Talk About Beliefs (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), and M. Richard,
Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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simple belief contexts. But, as I will argue, it is not the case that what goes
for the goose goes for the gander.
In his highly influential discussion on belief attribution and substitutiv-
ity, Nathan Salmon writes:
Now, there is no denying that, given the proper circumstances, we say things like
‘Lois Lane does not realize (know, believe) that Clark Kent is Superman’ and
‘There was a time when it was not known that Hesperus is Phosphorus’.2
Here Salmon clearly indicates that the same goes for ‘realize’, ‘know’, and
‘believe’, so he, at the very least, treats knowledge contexts and simple
belief contexts in the same way. Further, since it is evident that one cannot
realize that Hesperus is Phosphorus without acquiring a justification of
Hesperus being Phosphorus Salmon seems to be implying that one can
freely substitute coreferential names in all epistemic contexts. This is further
supported when he says that
…anyone who knows that Hesperus is Hesperus knows that Hesperus is Phos-
phorus, no matter how strongly he or she might deny the latter.3
Even more recently R.G. Heck, Jnr. switches from belief to knowledge
when discussing deficiencies of what he calls the Hybrid View.
Suppose that Tony does not know that George Orwell is Eric Blair and that Alex
asserts, in Tony’s presence, “Eric Blair is Eric Blair”. Suppose further that, in
reaction to Alex’s assertion, Tony forms the belief she would express as “George
Orwell is Eric Blair”. This belief does concern the correct objects. Reference is
preserved. Truth is preserved. Has Tony then come to know that George Orwell
is Eric Blair? Obviously not.4
And later in the same article
It is part and parcel of the Hybrid View that one can believe (or know) that
George Orwell is F, yet not believe that Eric Blair is F…5
But as I will argue, one cannot argue against substitutivity in simple belief
contexts by arguing against substitutivity in knowledge contexts.
—————
2 Salmon, Nathan, Frege’s Puzzle (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986): p. 81.
3 Salmon, p. 83.
4 Heck, Richard G., Jnr., “The Sense of Communication,” Mind (1995): 79-106, pp.
94-95.
5 Heck, p. 99.
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The examples show clearly that there is a tendency to treat all epistemic
contexts equally. This, I will argue, is a mistake. With the introduction of
singular propositions and ways of believing we should distinguish sharply
between simple belief contexts and contexts that involve justification. One
more example, where Ralph Kennedy uses our intuition that we cannot
freely substitute in knowledge contexts to raise a problem for the naïve
Russellian, will serve as a foil for the discussion.
II.
In “Salmon versus Kripke on the A Priori”6 Ralph Kennedy raises a problem
for direct designation theorists. The set-up of Kennedy’s problem is as
follows:
Someone we’ll call ‘Claudia’ has just found a stick that looks in every way like a
measuring stick except for lacking any numerals or other markings. The stick is
in fact exactly one meter long. Claudia says to herself: ‘This is certainly not a
yard stick: it is too long. Perhaps it is a meter stick. No, I’m sure it’s not long
enough for that.’ It would seem safe to say that Claudia … does not know that
the length of the stick is exactly a meter.7
Given the above it seems clear that Claudia does not know that the stick is
one meter long. But, as Kennedy points out, that can quickly change, for
Claudia can change her epistemic situation by engaging in a baptism ritual.
“She could say: ‘I think I’ll call the length of this stick, which is certainly
more than a yard and less than a meter, a ‘schmoo’.”8 Claudia would now
know that the length of the stick is one schmoo. But, as Kennedy points out,
the proposition that the length of the stick is one schmoo is the same as the
proposition that the length of the stick is one meter, since ‘schmoo’ and
‘meter’ are coreferential. So, Kennedy concludes, since the objects of
knowledge and beliefs are propositions and Claudia knows that the length of
the stick is one schmoo, she knows that the length of the stick is one meter.
And that, he claims, is simply absurd. (Kennedy adds to the absurdity by
adding to this Kripke’s view that as a result of the baptism Claudia would
know a priori that the length of the stick is one meter, but I will leave issues
related to apriority out of this discussion.9)
—————
6 Analysis 1987 pp. 158-161.
7 P. 159.
8 P. 159.
9 For my take on contingent a priori truths, see “The Contingent A Priori: Kripke’s
Two Types of Examples,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1991, pp. 195-205.
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The problem Kennedy raises is not limited to baptism situations. We can,
for example, easily imagine the following situation. Archibald meets the
chess player Kasparov. Upon seeing Kasparov Archibald sees a striking
likeness with him and a young prodigy, Weinstein, whom he met years ago
at the Botvinnik Chess Academy. Archibald says to himself: ‘There cer-
tainly is a strong resemblance between Kasparov and young Weinstein.
Perhaps Kasparov is Weinstein. No, I’m pretty sure he isn’t. After all, they
don’t even have the same name.’ Given this it is safe to say that Archibald
does not know that Kasparov is Weinstein. But then Archibald goes on,
proud of his knowledge of identity statements: ‘One thing I am sure of is
that Kasparov is Kasparov, but I wonder what became of Weinstein, for he
was very promising.’ As before, since the objects of knowledge are proposi-
tions and ‘Kasparov is Kasparov’ and ‘Kasparov is Weinstein’ express the
same proposition, then since Archibald knows that ‘Kasparov is Kasparov’
we get the absurd conclusion that Archibald knows that ‘Kasparov is Wein-
stein.’
We have the following pair of sentences;
1. Stick S is one meter long.
2. Stick S is one schmoo long.
And
3. Weinstein is Kasparov
4. Kasparov is Kasparov.
Archibald knows, without doubt, the proposition expressed by (4). It cer-
tainly appears that he does not know that Weinstein is Kasparov (the propo-
sition as expressed by (3)), for Archibald consciously went through the
reasons for and against accepting that Weinstein is Kasparov and concluded
that he had insufficient reasons for believing it true. That is, it is true that
Archibald does not know that Weinstein is Kasparov. Also, Claudia knows
the proposition expressed by (2) although she does not know that the stick is
one meter long. How can we account for the difference in epistemic status
with regard to the proposition?
—————
For the purpose of this paper I will assume that one can acquire knowledge of the
length of the stick via baptism. Whether the resulting knowledge is a priori is not
relevant for the issues addressed in this paper. In “Justification and Relative Aprior-
ity,” Ratio XII (1999): 148-161, I present arguments to the effect that a priori
knowledge of singular propositions should be relativized to how the given proposi-
tion is believed.
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Before going on I will make the following assumptions. First, the num-
bered sentences above express singular propositions, that is, propositions
that contain the object referred to as a constituent, as well as the property
attributed to the object. The proposition expressed by (4) contains, accord-
ingly, Kasparov and the property of being identical. Second, I will assume
that the following Russellian view about the metaphysics of belief is correct
Believing is a binary relation between a person and a proposition. But the
relation is mediated so that one believes a proposition in virtue of having
some psychological relation to a third entity, namely a mode of presentation
(often called “way of grasping,” “way of taking,” “representation,” or
“propositional guise” by Russellians). On this view the binary belief relation
can be analyzed into a ternary relation between a person, a proposition, and
a way of believing the proposition. So, roughly, A believes p iff A believes
p in some way or other.
Further, Russellians deny that utterances of belief sentences express
propositions about ways of believing. Instead, the utterances of belief
sentences only report what proposition is believed. That is, utterances of
belief sentences semantically reveal the binary relation that obtains between
the believer and a proposition believed.10 With this basic mechanism in
place let us go on and look at Claudia’s and Archibald’s epistemic situa-
tions.
So far, the most common Russellian response to the type of situation
Archibald finds himself in is to bite the bullet and say that Archibald knows
that Weinstein is Kasparov. The problem, the story goes, is that he does not
recognize the proposition when believed in one way as being the same as the
proposition when believed in another way. For example, Archibald does not
recognize that (3) expresses the same proposition as does (4). In spite of
that, the reply goes (as exemplified by, e.g., Salmon), since (3) expresses the
—————
10 At this point there are at least two tracks one can choose from. One track relies on
pragmatic implication where, in addition to the semantic information a report may
reveal, it pragmatically conveys information not contained in the report itself. For
example, if I utter ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ then the utterance could pragmatically
convey that I believe the proposition in such a way that I recognize that the morning
star and the evening star is one. This track is advocated by Salmon and Soames and
has recently been developed in Jennifer Saul’s “The Pragmatics of Belief Ascrip-
tion,” Philosophical Studies (1998), 363-389. Another track, advocated by David
Braun in “Understanding Belief Reports,” The Philosophical Review (1998), 555-
595, provides an alternative to the pragmatic account while relying simply on ways
of believing. I provide an account that relies on ways of believing in “Partial Propo-




same proposition as does (4) and Archibald knows that Kasparov is Kas-
parov, Archibald also knows that Weinstein is Kasparov.11
Similarly, so far the Russellian has argued that if Claudia knows that
stick S is one schmoo long, then she knows that stick S is one meter long.
Claudia just does not recognize the proposition when believed in one way as
being the same as the proposition when believed in another way.
The Russellian reply is deeply counterintuitive, and the virtue of Ken-
nedy’s example is that it is even more counterintuitive to accept the Russel-
lian explanation in Claudia’s case than it is in Archibald’s case. It seems
evident that Claudia does not know that S is one meter long. To say anything
to the contrary seems plainly wrong. In fact, puzzles like the ones above are
usually included as motivating factors behind neo-Fregean (and anti-
Russellian) views, and the Russellian type of explanation of Archibald’s and
Claudia’s epistemic situation given above have not proved satisfactory to
those that are skeptical of the Russellian view.
Given that the most prominent Russellian explanation of Claudia’s and
Archibald’s epistemic situations is less than satisfactory my goal is to
provide a more satisfactory explanation of their epistemic situation while
retaining the Russellian account of the metaphysics of belief.
Russellians use ways of believing to account for different cognitive roles
the same proposition might play. Since a singular proposition can be be-
lieved in more than one way, as when Archibald believes the proposition
expressed by (3) and (4) in different ways, Archibald can be in different
belief states while believing the same proposition, where we take a belief
state to be determined by the proposition believed together with the way in
which it is believed. Consequently, we cannot individuate his belief states
only by reference to the proposition believed. We need both the proposition
and the way in which it is believed in order to individuate Archibald’s belief
state. So, for Russellians it is ultimately ways of believing a singular propo-
sition that explains and accounts for differences in cognitive role. The
problem is that they have as of yet not developed an account of justification
that acknowledges this. Once we acknowledge that it is ways of believing
that explain differences in cognitive role, then it is apparent that it is how
one believes a proposition and not simply that one believes it that should be
subject to epistemic appraisal, such as whether the subject is justified in
believing the proposition in that way. What I will argue is that one can be
justified in believing a proposition in one way while not being justified in
believing it in a second way.
—————
11 See for example Salmon’s Frege’s Puzzle.
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Assuming that the belief relation is binary, all it takes to believe a propo-
sition is to stand in an appropriate relation to it. Consequently, since (3) and
(4) express the same proposition and Archibald stands in a belief relation to
the proposition expressed by (4), Archibald stands in a belief relation to the
proposition expressed by (3). Archibald may believe the proposition in two
different ways, but that does not change the fact that he does believe the
proposition. So, Archibald does believe that Weinstein is Kasparov.
The distinction we are faced with when dealing with belief and believing
as or believing in a way is somewhat analogous to the familiar distinction
between seeing and seeing as. Suppose that a police officer is being ques-
tioned in the shooting death of a child who had wielded a water pistol. The
officer is asked whether he saw the object the boy was holding, and he
answers yes, he did see it. All the officer is indicating is that he stood in a
perceiving relation with the object the boy held. The next question is, did
you see the object as a water pistol? It is the answer to this question that is
crucial to whether or not the officer’s actions were justified, for if he saw the
object as a water pistol he is not justified in shooting the boy, while if he
saw it as a gun he may be justified in doing so. The fact that the officer saw
the object is not very helpful in determining whether or not the officer acted
appropriately. The fact that the officer saw it as a gun is helpful in deter-
mining whether or not he acted appropriately.
 Similarly, when we say that Archibald believes the proposition, then that
only tells us that he stands in a belief relation to the proposition. It gives us
the content of his belief and not his belief state, or the way in which he
believes it. As the seeing relation, it doesn’t carry with it much information,
and it carries with it no information about how he believes the proposition.
As long as we focus just on the belief relation I do not find it to be very
counterintuitive that Archibald believes that Kasparov is Weinstein if he
believes that Kasparov is Kasparov, for here we are only saying that
Archibald stands in a belief relation to the proposition. It is only when we
turn our attention to justification and knowledge that our intuition is truly
tested. It is instructive to see that when these types of examples are used to
make the Russellian look bad they tend to focus on knowledge contexts
instead of simple belief contexts, e.g., the example is that Claudia knows that
the stick is one meter long.
The way in which a proposition is believed becomes more significant
once we turn to justification. It is evident that, when thinking about Garry
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Kasparov, Archibald is justified in believing that Kasparov is Kasparov. It is
equally evident that Archibald is not justified in believing that Kasparov is
Weinstein. He sees some resemblance between the grandmaster and the
young chess prodigy but, on reflection, concludes that they are not the same
person.
One plausible way of explaining the difference in Archibald’s justifica-
tion, and what I think is the right way of explaining it, is to point out that he
believes the proposition in two different ways and that justification is tied to
how a proposition is believed. The most plausible way of accounting for him
believing the proposition in two different ways is by him representing the
object in the proposition in different ways. When he thinks of Kasparov as
being identical with himself, i.e., when he believes that Kasparov is Kas-
parov, then he has one representation of Kasparov (although it may be a
complex representation). When he thinks of Kasparov as being identical
with Weinstein, then he has two representations of Kasparov that he takes to
be of different persons. Typically, when we have two representations they
represent different objects, and so Archibald suspects that Kasparov and
Weinstein are two persons. So, it is the difference in how Archibald repre-
sents Kasparov as a grown man and Kasparov (Weinstein) as a child that
translates into him believing the proposition in two different ways. That, in
turn, explains how he can be justified when believing the proposition in one
way and not justified when believing it in a different way. For Archibald
needs further evidence to justify his belief that Kasparov is Weinstein when
he believes the proposition in a way in which Kasparov is represented in two
different ways, as indicated above, while he does not need further evidence
to justify the belief that Kasparov is Kasparov when he believes the propo-
sition in a way that employs a single representation of Kasparov. Conse-
quently, since justification is required for knowledge, Archibald can know
that Kasparov is Kasparov, as when he thinks that Kasparov is identical to
himself, and at the same time not know that Kasparov is Weinstein, as when
he wonders whether Kasparov is the same as young Weinstein.
One may object that for Archibald to believe that Kasparov is Kasparov
is just for him to believe that Kasparov is Weinstein and that since I have not
identified two different beliefs I cannot argue that Archibald is justified in
holding one belief and not justified in holding the other.12 But the objection
—————
12 This objection was raised by a referee of the journal.
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fails to take into account that one is not justified in believing singular propo-
sitions simpliciter; one is justified in believing singular propositions as they
are believed. So, while I have not identified different propositions that
Archibald believes, I have identified different ways in which Archibald
believes the same proposition, or different belief states. Since it is how one
believes a proposition that is salient to epistemic appraisal, such as justifica-
tion, he can be justified in believing the proposition when believed in one
way and not justified in believing it when believed in a second way.
The object of belief, the proposition Archibald believes, is a singular
proposition. But the proposition can be apprehended in different ways which
explains the different cognitive role it may play in a person’s belief. A
Russellian can, as Salmon does, analyze the belief relation as a ternary
relation. What I am doing is making the third element in that analysis, the
way of believing, epistemically salient without it affecting the object of
belief or the proposition believed. The analysis I am proposing is therefore
compatible with Russellianism about beliefs of singular propositions.
We can explain Claudia’s epistemic situation in a similar way. Claudia
believes that S has the property of being one schmoo long, while she does
not believe that S has the property of being one meter long. Still, one
schmoo is one meter. Claudia represents one schmoo as being the length of
S. She does not represent one meter as being the length of S. Consequently,
she has different representations of a schmoo and a meter, which means that
she believes the proposition expressed by (2) (which is the same as the one
expressed by (1)) in two different ways. As a result of the different repre-
sentations, Claudia can be justified in believing the proposition in one way
and not justified in believing it in a different way.
The view that a person can be justified in believing a proposition when
believing it in one way and not justified in believing it when believing it in a
different way fits very well with the view that justification and evidence are
intimately connected. Suppose, for some proposition L, that person P be-
lieves that L, that L is true, and that P as no evidence for believing that L is
true. P, then, believes that L as a result of a lucky guess, but she nevertheless
believes that L. In order for P to turn her belief into knowledge she needs
evidence for L’s truth, for justification and evidence are intimately related.13
—————
13 How tight the connection between one’s justification for L and one’s evidence for
L needs to be is a matter of some controversy. Some philosophers say that P is
HEIMIR GEIRSSON
52
It seems clear that the evidence Claudia needs to possess to be justified in
believing that stick S is one schmoo when she represents the stick as being
one schmoo long is different from the evidence she needs for believing that
stick S is one meter when she represents the stick as being one meter long.
For the former, all she needs is her stipulative definition of ‘schmoo’ as
naming the length of stick S. For her to be justified in believing that stick S
is one meter, she needs an appropriate measuring device and a measurement.
The evidence needed for justification, in Claudia’s case, depends on how
she believes the proposition, and it is clear that just as the measuring device
cannot give her evidence for the stick being one schmoo long, the stipulation
of the stick being one schmoo long does not provide her with evidence for
the stick being one meter. Since Claudia needs different evidence for the
truth of her belief depending on how she believes the proposition in ques-
tion, she can be justified in believing the proposition in one way while not
being justified in believing it in a different way.
Same goes for Archibald. When he thinks to himself, proud of his
understanding of identity statements, that Kasparov is Kasparov (that Kas-
parov is identical to himself), then his belief is justified. When he wonders
whether Kasparov is Weinstein then he needs to carry out empirical investi-
gation, perhaps consisting of finding out from someone connected to the
Botvinnik Chess Academy what became of young Weinstein. So, how
Archibald believes the proposition determines the nature of the evidence he
needs for its truth.
The account of a propositional belief being justified depending on the
way in which one believes it goes against philosophical tradition, for tradi-
tional treatments of justification do not make justification dependant on
ways of believing. There is a reason for the popularity of the traditional
view. One can make the case that recent work on justification was done with
Fregean propositions in mind; propositions that one either believes or does
not believe, and propositions that do not admit of ways of believing. Once
one accepts Fregean propositions one either believes the proposition or one
does not believe the proposition, and the proposition believed fully discloses
the content of one’s belief. It wasn’t until with the reemergence of singular
—————
justified in believing that L if, and only if, believing L fits P’s evidence. Other want a
stronger connection and require that one has adequate evidence for L and that one
believes that L because of that evidence.
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propositions in the context of the direct designation theory of names that we
have propositions that admit of ways of believing. The problem is that it
appears that epistemic accounts of justification have not adjusted to devel-
opments in the philosophy of language. In particular, philosophers have
approached singular propositions in the same way as Fregean propositions
when it comes to justification and assumed that one either is or is not justi-
fied in believing a given singular proposition, even though these proposi-
tions admit of ways of believing. But once we admit that justification of
singular propositions is relative to how one believes the proposition, a
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